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Abstract
We study a differential game that governs the moderate-deviation heavy-traffic asymp-
totics of a multiclass single-server queueing control problem with a risk-sensitive cost. We
consider a cost set on a finite but sufficiently large time horizon, and show that this formu-
lation leads to stationary feedback policies for the game. Several aspects of the game are
explored, including its characterization via a (one-dimensional) free boundary problem, the
semi-explicit solution of an optimal strategy, and the specification of a saddle point. We
emphasize the analogy to the well-known Harrison-Taksar free boundary problem which
plays a similar role in the diffusion-scale heavy-traffic literature.
AMS subject classifications: 49N70, 60F10, 60K25, 93E20
Keywords: multi-class single-server queue, moderate deviations, heavy traffic, risk-
sensitive cost, the Harrison-Taksar free boundary problem
1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the moderate-deviation (MD) scale heavy-traffic analysis of a
queueing control problem. The model that is treated consists of a server that devotes its time
to customers from a number of classes, where a decision maker (DM) controls the allocation
of the server’s effort to each of the classes. Customers of each class are kept in a buffer of
finite length and so new arrivals of customers of a given class are lost when the corresponding
buffer is full. The DM may reject arrivals even when buffers are not full. The cost, that is of
risk-sensitive type and is rescaled at the MD regime, accounts for holding of customers in the
buffers as well as for rejections. The term ‘heavy traffic’ refers to the imposition of a critical
load condition, of the traffic intensity being close to one.
Heavy traffic analysis is traditionally carried out under the regime of diffusion-scale devi-
ations (sometimes also referred to as ordinary deviations), where a vast variety of queueing
control problems have been considered. However, there are very few results on the corre-
sponding MD regime. This paper aims at continuing the direction started in [1] to develop an
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approach to queueing control problems at the MD scale. While [1] finds various similarities to
the diffusion limit theory, a major dissimilarity between the two formulations is at the heart
of the present paper, as described below.
In [3] it has been shown that the large deviation asymptotics of risk-sensitive control prob-
lems associated with queueing models are governed by certain zero-sum differential games
(DG) (this approach was inspired by and built on analogous treatments of small noise con-
trolled diffusion models, such as [10]). In these games, the dynamics are given by a controlled
ordinary differential equation (ODE), and the players are the DM and nature, that attempt to
minimize and, respectively, maximize a cost. The DM again controls server’s effort allocation
and admission/rejection (except that the model no longer accounts for customers and so terms
such as effort and admission/rejection are interpreted as suitable elements of the ODE), and
nature may perturb the arrival and service rates. We will sometimes refer to the DM and
nature as the minimizing player and maximizing player, respectively, or simply as minimizer
and maximizer. The game’s cost consists of the original holding and rejection penalties, and
an additional term associated with the perturbation of the aforementioned rates. The latter
term is determined by the underlying large deviation action functional. The treatment of a
queueing control problem in the MD scale in [1] is similar to that of large deviations as far as
the tools are concerned, but it is argued in that paper that the games one obtains in the MD
regime tend to be solvable explicitly or semi-explicitly more often than under large deviation
scaling. In fact, the specific DG identified in [1] turned out to be solvable due to a property of
the model referred to in the heavy traffic literature as pathwise minimality, that enables ap-
proaching the game in a straightforward manner without appealing to dynamic programming
methods. However, this property is quite special and it is therefore desired to find methods
that apply in greater generality. In the present paper we aim at models that do not possess
the pathwise minimality property, for which the solution methods must rely on tools such as
dynamic programming. The model presented above is a prototype for models where a dynamic
programming approach is required; specifically, the Bellman equation for the model identifies a
free boundary point that is a crucial ingredient of the game’s solution. The paper is devoted to
the derivation and study of the DG itself, whereas the convergence of the risk-sensitive value
to that of the DG is the subject of a work in progress [2].
As mentioned above, it was argued in [1] that unlike treatment at the large deviations
regime, MD analysis parallels that of the diffusion regime in several ways. The present paper’s
contribution is best explained in the context of this relation. While the asymptotics of the
MD scaled risk-sensitive control problem leads to a DG, for diffusion scaled (risk-neutral)
control problems, they are typically described in terms of a Brownian control problem (BCP),
namely a control problem involving diffusion processes. The BCP and the DG are similar in
their structure, where the difference lies in that in the BCP, uncertainty is captured by the
stochasticity of the Brownian motion term, whereas in the DG the role of uncertainty is played
by an adversarial disturbance, in the form of the arrival and service rates being controlled by
nature. The structural similarity is manifested by the fact that the mapping from the Brownian
motion paths to the optimal control for the BCP is exactly the one used for the DG’s optimal
strategy. Moreover, a phenomenon known as state space collapse, where a BCP formulated in
dimension d reduces to a 1-dimensional control problem, occurs in the corresponding DG as
well (see [1] for details).
In the situation of the present paper, an analogy is less obvious, for reasons having to do
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with a disadvantage of working with a discount factor in a risk-sensitive cost formulation. In the
case of risk-neutral cost, a standard Markov decision process formulation based on discounted
cost has the advantage over a finite time horizon cost, that optimal controls are given by
stationary feedback. (For a typical queueing model this would often mean that decisions such
as admission, server effort allocation and routing depend on the collection of queue lengths
of the system in way that does not change over time.) However, it is well understood that
a discounted version of a risk-sensitive cost leads to optimal feedback that is time dependent
(this has been noticed first in [6]; several aspects of this issue were treated in [13]). Thus,
although it is desirable to aim at a formulation that leads to stationary feedback because of
the elegant structure of the solution, there does not seem to be a way to do so based on a
discounted risk-sensitive cost. We address this issue by considering a risk-sensitive cost over a
finite, but sufficiently large time horizon, in a formulation that does lead to stationary optimal
feedback controls as far as the DG is concerned.
It is instructive to notice that thanks to the desired property alluded to above, the afore-
mentioned analogy goes a step further. The Harrison-Taksar free boundary problem addresses
a 1-dimensional BCP with an additive singular control term, for which the solution is given
as a reflecting Brownian motion on an interval [a, b], where a and b form a free boundary in a
suitable Bellman equation [11]. The significance of the free boundary point b in applications to
diffusion scaled queueing models is that it determines a threshold, in queue length terms, for
rejection of arrivals. A (distinct) free boundary point identified in the present paper, denoted
by β0, plays the same role in the MD scale treatment: jobs are to be rejected once this point is
exceeded. As far as the DG is concerned, an optimal strategy for the DM is one that applies the
Skorohod map on the interval [0, β0] to the dynamics of the game, regardless of the behavior
of nature. Note the similar role played by the Skorohod map in both scenarios.
As far as analyzing the DG is concerned, the main contribution is the identification of the
optimal strategy alluded to above. Apart from that, we state and prove several additional
results, some of which form the basis for the result regarding the optimal strategy. Specifically,
we find an equivalent game that is easier to analyze, characterize the DG’s value function as
the unique viscosity solution to the underlying Bellman equation, solve the equation explicitly,
and identify a saddle point for the game as well as the optimal behavior of nature under the
optimal play of the DM.
To summarize the contribution of this paper, we have
• identified a queueing control problem that is prototypical to situations where a dynamic
programming approach is required to treat the DG governing the MD heavy traffic limit,
• proposed a risk-sensitive cost that leads to optimal stationary feedback for the DG,
• solved the Bellman equation, found an optimal strategy for the DM and studied properties
of the DG.
Let us finally mention that the model studied here was recently treated in diffusion-scale
heavy-traffic [4].
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the queueing model,
introduce the MD scaling, present our approach to formulation of the cost and introduce
the DG. In Section 3 we analyze the DG by introducing the hitting time game, present the
Bellman equation, characterize the DG’s value function as its unique viscosity solution, present
an explicit optimal strategy for the DM, as well as a saddle point result.
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We use the following notation. For a positive integer k and a, b ∈ Rk, a · b denotes the
usual scalar product. We denote [0,∞) by R+. Denote by AC([0, T ],Rk), C([0, T ],Rk) and
D([0, T ],Rk) the spaces of absolutely continuous functions [resp., continuous functions, func-
tions that are right-continuous with finite left limits (RCLL)] mapping [0, T ] → Rk. Write
AC0([0, T ],Rk) and C0([0, T ],Rk) for the subsets of the corresponding function spaces, of func-
tions that start at zero. Endow the space D([0, T ],Rk) with the usual Skorohod topology.
2 Model and results
2.1 The single-class model
We describe the probabilistic model that provides the main motivation for our DG formulation.
The DG is derived from this model by considering scaling limits of the latter. Because the
focus of the present paper is on the analysis of the DG itself, the derivation will only be carried
out in a heuristic manner. In a work in progress [2] this relation is explored further and a
rigorous relation is established.
We first present a basic model, then an extension of it. In the basic model, that we will
call the single-class model, customers arrive into a buffer with finite room and are served by a
single server in the order of arrival. The decision maker may reject arrivals even if the buffer
is not full, but in order to keep the buffer length constraint it must always reject arrivals that
occur when the buffer is full. The cost functional will involve penalties based on queue-length
as well as rejection.
Scaling is introduced by considering a sequence of systems, indexed by n ∈ N. In the n-th
system, arrivals occur according to a renewal process, An, for which the mean inter-arrival time
is given by 1/λn. Denote by Sn(t) the number of service completions by the time the server
has worked for t units of time. Then the inter-jump times of this process correspond to service
time durations, and it is assumed that Sn is a renewal process (that is, the service times are
i.i.d.). It is also assumed that An and Sn are mutually independent. The mean service time
is denoted by 1/µn. It is assumed that the squared coefficient of variation for inter-arrival
and service time distribution are fixed, and these constants are denoted by σ2
IA
∈ (0,∞) and
σ2
ST
∈ (0,∞), respectively.
Denoting the number of customers in the n-th system at time t by Xn(t), the number of
rejections until time t by Rn(t), and the cumulative business time till t by T n(t), we have the
balance equation
Xn(t) = Xn(0) +An(t)− Sn(T n(t))−Rn(t), t ≥ 0. (1)
The process Un = (T n, Rn) is regarded as a control. The finite buffer constraint reads Xn(t) ≤
Dn for all t, where Dn are given constants.
We consider the moderate deviations rate parameters {bn}, that form a sequence, fixed
throughout, with the property that lim bn =∞ while limn−1/2bn = 0, as n→∞. We assume
that as n→∞,
λn = λn+ λ˜bn
√
n+ o(bn
√
n), µn = µn+ µ˜bn
√
n+ o(bn
√
n),
where λ ∈ (0,∞), µ ∈ (0,∞), λ˜ ∈ R and µ˜ ∈ R are fixed. Moreover, it is assumed that the
system is critically loaded, namely λ = µ.
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For T > 0, let Ii(T, ·), i = 1, 2, be functions mapping D([0, T ],R) to R+∪{+∞} defined as
Ii(T, ψ) =


ci
∫ T
0
ψ˙2(s)ds if ψ ∈ AC0([0, T ],R),
+∞ otherwise,
(2)
where
c1 =
1
2µσ2IA
and c2 =
1
2µσ2ST
.
In the sequel we will also use the notation
c = (c−11 + c
−1
2 )
−1 =
1
2µ(σ2ST + σ
2
AI)
.
Let I(T, ψ) := I1(T, ψ
1) + I2(T, ψ
2). Under suitable exponential moment conditions, the cen-
tered, scaled versions,
A˜n(t) =
1
bn
√
n
(An(t)− λnt), S˜n(t) = 1
bn
√
n
(Sn(t)− µnt), t ≥ 0,
of the renewal processes alluded to above satisfy a moderate deviation principle [14], [15]. That
is, given T > 0 and a bounded, continuous function H : D([0, T ],R)2 → R, one has
lim
n→∞
1
b2n
logEeb
2
nH(A˜
n,S˜n) = sup{H(ψ) − I(ψ) : ψ ∈ AC0([0, T ],R)2}. (3)
Introduce scaled versions of the remaining two processes, namely
R˜n(t) :=
1
bn
√
n
Rn(t), X˜n(t) :=
1
bn
√
n
Xn(t). (4)
The buffer size is assumed to be given by Dn = bn
√
nD for a constant D > 0, and so the buffer
constraint can now be written as
X˜n(t) ∈ [0,D], t ≥ 0. (5)
To define the cost, let Cn(t) =
∫ t
0 h(X˜
n(s))ds+rR˜n(t), where, throughout, h is a continuous
increasing function from [0,D] to R+ that satisfies h(0) = 0 and accounts for holding cost,
and r > 0 is a constant representing per-customer rejection penalty. One may consider several
versions of risk-sensitive costs based on the process Cn, the most natural ones being a cost
defined over a finite time horizon,
J1 =
1
b2n
logEeb
2
n
∫ T
t
Cn(s)ds,
a long-run average cost,
J2 = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
1
b2n
logEeb
2
n
∫ T
0
Cn(t)dt,
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and two versions based on discount (κ > 0 being the discount rate)
J3 =
1
b2n
logEeb
2
n
∫∞
0
e−κtCn(t)dt, J4 =
1
b2n
logE
∫ ∞
0
e−κteb
2
nC
n(t)dt.
Because our setting is not Markovian, dynamic programming methods are not applicable in
a direct fashion for the nth system. They are only applicable as far as the limit behavior
is concerned. Thus the discussion that follows regards only the limiting behavior as well as
the Markovian setting, that occurs in the special case when the driving renewal processes
are Poisson. Working with a cost defined over a finite time horizon, such as J1, suffers from
the drawback that it leads to optimal feedback policies that are non-stationary. Long-run
average cost of risk-sensitive type has been studied in several papers starting from [9]. It
leads to stationary optimal feedback policies. However, working with this cost under scaling
limits might be quite demanding technically, and therefore we will not focus on this cost here.
Regarding the version J3 of a discounted cost, it is known to lead to non-stationary optimal
feedback [6]. The reader is referred to [13] for discussion and several contributions regarding
this issue. The formulation we propose is close in spirit to J4. Specifically, given n and T , we
consider the following cost associated with a control Un, namely
Jn(Un, T ) :=
1
b2n
logE
[ ∫ T
0
eb
2
nC
n(t)dt
]
=
1
b2n
logE
[ ∫ T
0
eb
2
n[
∫ t
0
h(X˜n(s))ds+rR˜n(t))]dt
]
, (6)
where (X˜n, R˜n) are the scaled versions of the processes (Xn, Rn) corresponding to the control
Un. The value is given by
V n(T ) = inf
Un
Jn(Un, T ), (7)
and our aim will be to understand the limit
lim sup
T→∞
lim sup
n→∞
V n(T ). (8)
2.2 Differential game setting
We provide a heuristic argument for the claim that the limit of V n is given by a game, before
turning to a precise definition of the game. Note first that if one could write Cn as function
H of the data (A˜n, S˜n) and the control Un, namely Cn = H(Un, A˜n, S˜n), then based on (3),
and ignoring questions of boundedness and continuity, one would obtain in the limit a game,
defined in terms of the cost H(u, ψ)− I(ψ), maximized over ψ (as in (3)) and minimized over u
(as in (7)). Although this conclusion is not solid due to questions of continuity, one can argue
by appealing to specific aspects of the dependence of Cn on the data and control. Specifically,
one notes from (1) that
X˜n(t) = X˜n(0) + y˜nt+ A˜n(t)− S˜n(T n(t)) + Z˜n(t)− R˜n(t), (9)
where we denote
Z˜n(t) :=
µn
n
√
n
bn
(t− T n(t)), y˜n := λ˜n − µ˜n. (10)
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Moreover, the processes Z˜n and R˜n are nondecreasing, whereas, by assumption, X˜n(0) → x
and y˜n → y. It is thus reasonable to consider a DG with dynamics ϕ(t) = x + yt + ψ1(t) −
ψ2(t) + ζ(t) − ̺(t) where ζ and ̺ are nondecreasing (corresponding to the processes Zn and
Rn), ϕ takes values in [0,D] (because of (5)), and the cost takes the form
sup
T∈[0,∞)
{∫ T
0
h(ϕ(t))dt + r̺(T )− I(T, ψ)
}
.
It is maximized over ψ and minimized over u = (̺, ζ). The precise formulation along these
lines is given next.
Let y = λ˜− µ˜. Denote by P = C0([0,∞),R) and
E = {ξ ∈ D([0,∞),R+) : ξ is nondecreasing}.
Endow both spaces with the uniform-on-compacts topology. Given ψ1, ψ2 ∈ P and ζ, ̺ ∈ E ,
the dynamics associated with the initial condition x and the data ψ, ζ, ̺ is given by
ϕ(t) = x+ yt+ ψ1(t)− ψ2(t) + ζ(t)− ̺(t), t ≥ 0. (11)
We sometimes write the dependence of the dynamics on the data as ϕ[ψ, ζ, ̺]. Note the
analogy between the above equation and equation (9), and between the condition that ζ and
̺ are nondecreasing and property (10). The control ζ stands for the scaled idle time process
Z˜n and ̺ stands for the scaled rejection process R˜n. The following condition, analogous to
property (5), will also be in use, namely
ϕ(t) ∈ [0,D], t ≥ 0. (12)
The game is defined in the sense of Elliott and Kalton [7], for which we need the notion of
strategies. A measurable mapping α : P2 → E2 is called a strategy for the minimizing player
if it satisfies a causality property. Namely, for every ψ = (ψ1, ψ2), ψ˜ = (ψ˜1, ψ˜2) ∈ P2 and
t ∈ [0,∞),
(ψ1, ψ2)(s) = (ψ˜1, ψ˜2)(s) for every s ∈ [0, t] implies α[ψ](s) = α[ψ˜](s) for every s ∈ [0, t].
(13)
Given an initial condition x, a strategy α is said to be admissible if, whenever (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ P2 and
(ζ, ̺) = α[ψ], the corresponding dynamics (11) satisfies the buffer size constraint (12). The set
of all admissible strategies for the minimizing player is denoted by A (or, when the dependence
on the initial condition is important, Ax). Given T ∈ R+, x ∈ [0,D], ψ = (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ P2, and
(ζ, ̺) ∈ E2, we define the cost until time T by
c(x, T, ψ, ζ, ̺) :=
∫ T
0
h(ϕ(t))dt + r̺(T )− I(T, ψ),
where ϕ is the corresponding dynamics. The value of the game is defined by
V (x) := inf
α∈Ax
sup
ψ∈P2,T∈R+
c(x, T, ψ, α[ψ]).
We call ψ the path control and the T a time control, or sometimes the termination time. Note
that both are controlled by the maximizer.
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2.3 The multi-class model
In a similar manner to the single-class model, we describe a model with I ≥ 1 classes of
customers, where a buffer of finite length is dedicated to each class. The various primitives,
parameters and processes are denoted with an additional index i ∈ I := {1, . . . , I}, representing
the class. As far as the control is concerned, an important difference from the single-class model
is that the DM has to determine the allocation of effort to the various classes, on top of making
admission decisions. Thus, with S = {x = (x1, . . . , xI) ∈ [0, 1]I :
∑
xi ≤ 1}, let Bn be a process
taking values in S, whose i-th component represents the fraction of effort devoted by the server
to the class-i customer at the head of the line. Then the number of service completions of
class-i jobs during the time interval [0, t] is given by Sni (T
n
i (t)), where
T ni (t) :=
∫ t
0
Bni (s)ds (14)
is the time devoted to class-i customers by time t. We have the balance equation
Xni (t) = X
n
i (0) +A
n
i (t)− Sni (T ni (t))−Rni (t). (15)
The process Un := (Bn, Rn) is now regarded as a control. For i ∈ I fixed constants Di > 0
serve in defining the buffer sizes, and so the definition of an admissible control now requires
that for every i ∈ I one has
Xni (t) ∈ [0, bn
√
nDi], t ≥ 0.
Scaling that is applied in a similar fashion to that in the single-class case gives rise to the
equation
X˜ni (t) = X˜
n
i (0) + y
n
i t+ A˜
n
i (t)− S˜ni (T ni (t)) + Zni (t)− R˜ni (t), (16)
where we denote ρi = λi/µi and
Zni (t) :=
µni
n
√
n
bn
(ρit− T ni (t)), yni := λ˜ni − ρiµ˜ni .
The critical load condition now takes the form
∑
i ρi = 1.
An important role is played by the property∑
i
n
µni
Zni starts from zero and is nondecreasing, (17)
that holds thanks to the fact that
∑
iB
n
i ≤ 1 while
∑
i ρi = 1. The probabilistic assumptions
on the primitives are analogous to those previously imposed, where in addition, the 2I primitive
processes are assumed mutually independent. Finally, the cost is assumed to be of the form
Jn(Un, T ) :=
1
b2n
logE
[ ∫ T
0
eb
2
n[
∫ t
0
h·X˜n(s))ds+r·R˜n(t))]dt
]
,
where h and r are given positive vectors and the value is given by
V n(T ) = inf
Un
Jn(Un, T ).
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Without going into details, we present the form of the DG that is obtained from the balance
equation (16), the condition (17) and the cost structure; the derivation is very similar to that
presented earlier. Let θ = ( 1µ1 , . . . ,
1
µI
) and y = (y1, . . . , yI) where yi = λ˜i − ρiµ˜i. Denote
Eθ = {ζ ∈ D([0, T ],RI+) : θ · ζ is nondecreasing}.
Given ψ = (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ P2I , ζ ∈ Eθ, and ̺ ∈ EI , the dynamics, ϕ = (ϕ1, . . . , ϕI), associated with
the initial state x ∈∏Ii=1[0,Di] and the data ψ, ζ, and ̺ is given by
ϕi(t) = xi + yit+ ψ
1
i (t)− ψ2i (t) + ζi(t)− ̺i(t), t ≥ 0, i ∈ I. (18)
Note the analogy between the above equation and equation (16), and between the condition
that θ · ζ is nondecreasing and property (17). The buffer constraint is now translated into the
condition
ϕi(t) ∈ [0,Di], t ≥ 0, i ∈ I.
A measurable mapping α : P2I → Eθ × EI is called a strategy for the minimizing player if it
satisfies a causality property. Namely, for every ψ, ψ˜ ∈ P2I and t ∈ [0, T ],
ψ(s) = ψ˜(s) for all s ∈ [0, t] implies α[ψ](s) = α[ψ˜](s) for all s ∈ [0, t].
As before, we denote by Ax the set of all admissible strategies given the initial state x. The
cost is given by
c(x, T, ψ, ζ, ̺) :=
∫ T
0
h · ϕ(t)dt+ r · ̺(T )− J(T, ψ),
where ϕ is the corresponding dynamics given in (18) and J the corresponding rate function
(specified in (93) in the appendix). The value of the game is defined by
VMD(x) := inf
α∈Ax
sup
ψ∈P2I ,T∈R+
c(x, T, ψ, α[ψ]).
Our result concerning this DG is that it can be reduced to the one introduced earlier for the
single-class model. In the heavy traffic literature, this type of result is often called state space
collapse. The precise statement of this reduction, along with its proof are provided in the
appendix. Since this multidimensional version of the game can be reduced to a one-dimensional
one, the rest of this paper is concerned with the latter.
3 Solution and analysis of the game
In this section we provide a solution of the game. After proving some basic properties in Section
3.1, we present, in Section 3.2, an equivalent hitting time game which is easier to analyze. In
Section 3.3 we present the Bellman equation associated with the game. In Section 3.4 we
characterize the value function as a viscosity solution of the Bellman equation. An explicit
expression for the minimizer’s optimal strategy appears in Section 3.5. Finally, a saddle point
result appears in Section 3.6.
The minimizer’s strategy that is shown to be optimal is of a β-barrier form. Informally,
this is a strategy that uses the minimal control (ζ, ̺) so as to keep the dynamics ϕ in [0, β]
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at all times. The definition is based on the Skorohod map on an interval. To introduce
this map, fix a < b. The Skohorod map on the interval [a, b], denoted by Γ[a,b], is a map
D([0,∞),R) → D([0,∞),R3). It is characterized as the solution map ω → (ϕ, η1, η2) to the
so called Skorohod Problem, namely the problem of finding, for a given ω, a triplet (ϕ, η1, η2),
such that
ϕ = ω + η1 − η2, ϕ(t) ∈ [a, b] for all t, (19)
ηi are nonnegative and nondecreasing, ηi(0−) = 0, and∫
[0,∞)
1(a,b](ϕ)dη1 =
∫
[0,∞)
1[a,b)(ϕ)dη2 = 0. (20)
By writing ηi(0−) = 0 we adopt the convention that ηi(0) > 0 is regarded a jump at zero. This
convention, in conjunction with
∫
[0,∞) 1(a,b](ϕ)dη1 = 0 (resp.,
∫
[0,∞) 1[a,b)(ϕ)dη2 = 0), means
that if ω(0) < a (resp., ω(0) > b) then ϕ(0) = a (resp., b). If, however, ω(0) ∈ [a, b] then
ϕ(0) = ω(0), and ηi have no jump at zero.
See [12] for existence and uniqueness of solutions, and continuity and further properties of
the map. In particular, it is well-known that Γ[a,b] is continuous in the uniform-on-compacts
topology.
Definition 3.1 Fix (x, β) ∈ [0,D]2. The strategy αβ = (αβ,1, αβ,2) ∈ Ax is called a β-barrier
strategy if for every ψ ∈ P2 one has (ϕ,αβ,1, αβ,2)[ψ] = Γ[0,β](ψ).
The specific value β0 of β that gives rise to an optimal strategy will be determined later,
based on the free boundary associated with the Bellman equation. For the moment we only
comment that it is possible to select β = 0, and in fact this choice turns out to be useful in
Section 3.1 below.
3.1 Basic properties
We begin by providing a necessary and sufficient condition for the value function to be finite
and presenting further properties that are used in the sequel.
Lemma 3.1 i. If −y < r/(4c) then for every x ∈ [0,D] one has V (x) =∞.
ii. If −y ≥ r/(4c) then for every x ∈ [0,D] one has 0 ≤ V (x) ≤ rx, in particular V (0) = 0.
Moreover, V is nondecreasing. Finally, V is continuous.
Proof of Lemma 3.1: i. Fix x ∈ [0,D]. Consider a maximizer’s control given by T ♯ ∈ R+ and
ψ♯,1(t) = rt/(2c1), ψ
♯,2(t) = −rt/(2c2), t ≥ 0. Let α ∈ Ax, and denote by (ζ♯, ̺♯) = α[ψ♯]. The
dynamics under (ψ♯,1, ψ♯,2) and (ζ♯, ̺♯) is denoted by ϕ♯. We show that the cost is bounded
below by a quantity that converges to infinity as T ♯ → ∞. Since the maximizer is free to
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choose T ♯ ∈ R+, the supremum of the cost function over T is infinity. Indeed,
c(x, T ♯, ψ♯, α♯[ψ♯]) =
∫ T ♯
0
h(ϕ♯(t))dt+ r̺♯(T )− I(T ♯, ψ♯) (21)
≥ r̺♯(T ♯)− I(T ♯, ψ♯) = r̺♯(T ♯)− 1
4c
r2T ♯ (22)
≥ r(x+ 1
2c
rT ♯ + yT ♯ + ζ♯(T )−D)− 1
4c
r2T ♯ (23)
= r(x−D) + ( 1
4c
r2 + yr)T ♯ + rζ(T ♯). (24)
Inequality (22) follows since h is nonnegative. Inequality (23) follows by the dynamics of the
game (see (11)) and constraint (12). Equation (24) is merely a rearrangement of the terms.
ii. Fix x ∈ [0,D]. To see why 0 ≤ V (x) ≤ rx we show that the maximizer (resp., minimizer)
can force a cost of at least 0 (resp., at most rx). The maximizer may choose T = 0, in which
case for any strategy α ∈ Ax, the cost is bounded below by 0. This shows V (x) ≥ 0. The
minimizer can choose a 0-barrier strategy so that the dynamics remain at zero. That is, the
minimizer may choose a strategy α0 that, given T ∈ R+ and ψ ∈ P2 responds with (ζ0, ̺0)
where
ζ˙0(t) = (ψ˙
1(t)− ψ˙2(t) + y)−, 0 < t ≤ T,
˙̺0(t) = (ψ˙
1(t)− ψ˙2(t) + y)+, 0 < t ≤ T,
with ζ0(0) = 0 and ̺0(0) = x. Fix T ∈ R+ and ψ ∈ P2. From the definition of (ζ0, ̺0), and
since for every t > 0 one has h(ϕ(t)) = h(0) = 0 it follows that
c(x, T, ψ, α0[ψ]) =
∫ T
0
h(ϕ(t))dt + r̺0(T )− I(T, ψ) (25)
= r̺0(0) +
∫ T
0
[h(ϕ(t)) + r(ψ˙1(t)− ψ˙2(t) + y)+
− c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t)]dt
= r̺0(0) +
∫ T
0
[r(ψ˙1(t)− ψ˙2(t) + y)+ − c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t)]dt.
One can easily verify that for every ψ˙1(t), ψ˙2(t) ∈ R the expression given in the integrand is
bounded above by r2/(4c) + ry, which is nonpositive by assumption. Therefore the cost given
in (25) is bounded above by r̺(0) = rx. This shows V (x) ≤ rx.
From the inequality 0 ≤ V (x) ≤ rx applied to x = 0 it follows that V (0) = 0.
To see why V is nondecreasing fix 0 ≤ x1 < x2 ≤ D. Given any strategy α2 associated with
the initial state x2, the minimizer may choose for the initial state x1 a strategy α1 obtained
from α2 by adding to the ζ component the constant x2− x1 (without incurring any additional
cost), leaving the ̺ component as under α2. Therefore, the optimal cost associated with the
initial state x1 is less than or equal to that associated with x2. That is, V (x1) ≤ V (x2).
Since V is nondecreasing its continuity follows by showing that it has no upwards jumps.
Assume to the contrary that V has a jump of size M > 0 at x ∈ [0,D]. In case, x ∈ (0,D)
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then for every sufficiently small δ > 0 one has V (x− δ) ≤ V (x+ δ)−M . W.l.o.g. assume that
δ < min{x,M/(4r)}. Therefore, by the definition of V applied to x− δ it follows that there is
a strategy α = (α1, α2) ∈ Ax−δ such that
sup
ψ∈P2,T∈R+
c(x− δ, T, ψ, α[ψ]) < V (x− δ) +M/2. (26)
Define a new strategy αˆ = (αˆ1, αˆ2) ∈ Ax+δ by (αˆ1, αˆ2) = (α1, α2 − 2δ) then clearly,
sup
ψ∈P2,T∈R+
c(x+ δ, T, ψ, αˆ[ψ]) = 2δ + sup
ψ∈P2,T∈R+
c(x− δ, T, ψ, α[ψ]). (27)
From (26) and (27) and the choice of δ it follows that supψ∈P2,T∈R+ c(x + δ, T, ψ, αˆ[ψ]) <
V (x + δ), which contradicts the definition of V . In case x = 0 or x = D the proof requires
only minor modifications and therefore omitted.
✷
In the rest of the paper, our standing assumption will be that −y ≥ r/(4c) holds; thus by
Lemma 3.1 the value function is finite.
3.2 The hitting time game
In the proof of Lemma 3.1 we saw that if the initial state of the dynamics, ϕ(0) = x, equals
zero then the maximizer prefers to terminate the game immediately. Therefore, it seems
plausible that, for a general initial condition, if both players play in an optimal way then as
soon as the dynamics hits zero, the game is terminated. Hence the minimizer has no interest
in ever activating the ζ component, since doing so only increases the running cost h(ϕ(t)) and
postpones the termination of the game. In this section we validate this intuition by formulating
an equivalent game that admits the following modifications: first, the ζ component of the
minimizer’s control vanishes. Second, the game terminates when the dynamics hit zero.
Given ψ ∈ P2 and ̺ ∈ E , the dynamics of the new game are given by
ϕ = ϕx,ψ,̺(t) := x+ yt+ ψ
1(t)− ψ2(t)− ̺(t), t ≥ 0.
A strategy is a map α¯ : P2 → E that satisfies the following version of the causality property:
ψ(s) = ψ˜(s) for every s ∈ [0, t] implies α¯[ψ](s) = α¯[ψ˜](s) for every s ∈ [0, t].
A strategy is said to be admissible if for every t ≥ 0 the dynamics satisfies ϕ(t) ∈ [0,D].
Denote the set of all such strategies by A¯x. Let
τ = τ(x, ψ, ̺) := inf{t ≥ 0 : ϕx,ψ,̺(t) = 0}, (28)
where throughout we use the convention inf ∅ =∞. For x ∈ [0,D] and α¯ ∈ A¯x, define
Q[x, α¯] := {ψ ∈ P2 : τ(x, ψ, α¯[ψ]) <∞}.
This is the set of all the controls for which the dynamics of the game hits zero in a finite time.
Given x ∈ [0,D], α¯ ∈ A¯x, and ψ ∈ Q[x, α¯], we define the cost by
c¯(x, ψ, α¯[ψ]) :=
∫ τ
0
h(ϕ(t))dt + rα¯[ψ](τ) − I(τ, ψ),
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where τ = τ(x, ψ, α¯[ψ]). The value of the hitting time game is defined by
U(x) = inf
α¯∈A¯x
sup
ψ∈Q[x,α¯]
c¯(x, ψ, α¯[ψ]).
The following proposition states that the value functions of both games are equal to each other.
Proposition 3.1 If −y ≥ r/(4c) holds then for every x ∈ [0,D] one has V (x) = U(x).
Proof: For every x ∈ [0,D], every ψ = (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ P2, and every α = (α1, α2) ∈ Ax let
π = π(x, ψ, α) := inf{t ≥ 0 : x+ yt+ ψ1(t)− ψ2(t) + α1[ψ](t) − α2[ψ](t) = 0}.
This is the first time that the dynamics in the original game hit zero. Let Ax,0 be the set of
all admissible strategies α : P2 → E2 such that α1[ψ] = 0 on [0, π) and thereafter α acts as a
0-barrier strategy.
We prove the proposition in two steps. First, we show that the infimum in the definition
of V can be taken over the set Ax,0. That is,
V (x) = V0(x) := inf
α∈Ax,0
sup
ψ∈P2,T∈R+
c(x, T, ψ, α[ψ]). (29)
On the second step we show that we can replace the set of controls P2×R+ for the maximizer
by Q[x, α2]. That is,
V0(x) = V1(x) := inf
α∈Ax,0
sup
ψ∈Q[x,α2]
c¯(x, ψ, α2[ψ]). (30)
Once this is achieved, the result follows because it is obvious that V1 = U .
Step 1: Fix x ∈ [0,D]. Since Ax,0 ⊆ Ax it is clear that V (x) ≤ V0(x).
To prove that V (x) ≥ V0(x) we show that for every strategy α ∈ Ax there exists a strategy
α∗ ∈ Ax,0 such that for every ψ ∈ P2 one has
sup
T∈R+
c(x, T, ψ, α[ψ]) ≥ sup
T∈R+
c(x, T, ψ, α∗[ψ]). (31)
By taking supψ∈P2 and then infα∈Ax it then follows that V (x) ≥ V0(x). To show (31), fix a
strategy α = (α1, α2) ∈ Ax. Given ψ ∈ P2, let
π∗ = π∗(x, ψ, α) := inf{t ≥ 0 : x+ yt+ ψ1(t)− ψ2(t)− α2[ψ](t) ≤ 0}.
Notice that we omitted α1[ψ] from the dynamics. Define α
∗[ψ](t) = (0, α2[ψ](t)), 0 ≤ t < π∗,
and thereafter let α∗ act as a 0-barrier strategy. One has that π∗(x, ψ, α) = τ(x, ψ, α2[ψ]). By
construction, α∗2[ψ](t) ≤ α2[ψ](t) for every t ∈ [0, π∗]. Let ϕ (resp., ϕ∗) denote the dynamics
associated with ψ and α (resp., ψ and α∗). Obviously,
sup
T∈R+
c(x, T, ψ, α[ψ]) = sup
T∈R+
{∫ T
0
h(ϕ(t))dt + rα2[ψ](π
∗)− I(T, ψ)
}
(32)
≥ sup
T∈R+
{∫ T∧π∗
0
h(ϕ(t))dt + rα2[ψ](T ∧ π∗)− I(T ∧ π∗, ψ)
}
.
13
Since over the time interval [0, π∗] one has α∗2[ψ] ≤ α2[ψ] and ϕ∗ ≤ ϕ, and since h is increasing,
it follows that the r.h.s. of (32) will not increase if we replace (α,ϕ) by (α∗, ϕ∗). Therefore,
for every ψ ∈ P2 one has
sup
T∈R+
c(x, T, ψ, α[ψ]) ≥ sup
T∈R+
c(x, T ∧ π∗, ψ, α∗[ψ]).
Since starting at time π∗ the minimizer uses 0-barrier strategy, it follows by the same arguments
as in part (ii) of the proof of Lemma 3.1 that the maximizer terminates the game at time π∗
or earlier. Inequality (31) follows.
Step 2: Recall that −y ≥ r/(4c) and therefore V (x) < ∞. Therefore, in order to show that
(30) holds, it suffices to show that for every α ∈ Ax,0 for which supψ∈P2 c(x, T, ψ, α[ψ]) < ∞,
one has
sup
ψ∈P2,T∈R+
c(x, T, ψ, α[ψ]) = sup
ψ∈Q[x,α2]
c¯(x, ψ, α2[ψ]). (33)
We do that by showing two sided inequalities. The inequality ≥ is obvious since
sup
ψ∈Q[x,α2]
c¯(x, ψ, α2[ψ]) = sup
ψ∈Q[x,α2]
c(x, π, ψ, α[ψ]) (34)
and the supremum on the r.h.s. of (34) is taken over a smaller set than the supremum on the
l.h.s. of (33).
To prove the reverse inequality we show that for every ψ ∈ P2 and every T ∈ R+ there is
ψ∗ ∈ Q[x, α2] such that
c(x, T, ψ, α[ψ]) ≤ c¯(x, ψ∗, α2[ψ∗]). (35)
Let π = π(x, ψ, α) be the first time the dynamics under ψ and α hit zero, possibly infinity. We
argue separately for T that is greater than π and for T that is smaller than or equal to π. For
T > π, let ψ∗ = ψ. By the definition of Ax,0 π(x, ψ, α) = τ(x, ψ∗, α2[ψ∗]). Denote this time
by τ . The cost c(x, T, ψ, α[ψ]) can be expressed as the sum of the cost until time τ and the
cost between times τ and T . The first cost is c(x, τ, ψ, α[ψ]) = c¯(x, ψ∗, α2[ψ
∗]), and the second
cost is non positive since the minimizer uses a 0-barrier strategy after time τ and in the proof
of Lemma 3.1 we showed that the maximizer optimal cost under this strategy is zero.
For T ≤ τ define ψ∗ = ψ(· ∧ T ). The dynamics associated with ψ∗ = (ψ∗,1, ψ∗,2) and α
until time τ∗ = τ(x, ψ∗, α2) is ϕ
∗(t) = x + yt + ψ∗,1(t) − ψ∗,2(t) − α2[ψ](t). Since y < 0 and
ψ∗ is constant on the time interval [T,∞) it follows that ϕ∗ hits zero in a finite time, and
therefore ψ∗ ∈ Q[x, α2]. Thus
c¯(x, ψ∗, α2[ψ
∗]) = c(x, τ∗, ψ∗, α2[ψ
∗])
= c(x, T, ψ∗, α2[ψ
∗]) +
∫ τ∗
T
h(ϕ∗(t))dt + r(α2[ψ
∗](τ∗)− α2[ψ∗](T ))
− (I(τ∗, ψ∗)− I(T, ψ∗))
≤ c(x, T, ψ∗, α2[ψ∗]) = c(x, T, ψ, α2[ψ∗]).
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The second equality expresses merely the sum of the cost until time T and the cost between
times T and τ∗. The inequality follows since α2 and h are nondecreasing and since ψ˙
1 = ψ˙2 = 0
on the time interval [T, τ∗]. The last equality follows since on the time interval [0, T ] we chose
ψ∗ to agree with ψ.
✷
3.3 Derivation of the Bellman equation
Here we give an intuitive approach towards the solution of the game, present the corresponding
Bellman equation and discuss its solvability. The derivation of the Bellman equation uses the
hitting time game.
We first write the chain rule under the dynamics
ϕ(t) = x+ yt+ ψ1(t)− ψ2(t)− ̺(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
where x ∈ [0,D], T ∈ R+, ψ ∈ P2, and ̺ ∈ E . Namely, for any function f ∈ C1([0,D],R) one
has
f(ϕ(T )) = f(x) +
∫ T
0
f ′(ϕ(t))(dψ1(t)− dψ2(t) + ydt− d̺c(t)) +
∑
0≤t≤T
∆f(ϕ)(t), (36)
where ̺c is the continuous part of ̺. Thus
∫ T
0
[
−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t))
]
dt+ r̺(T ) + f(ϕ(T )) (37)
= f(x) +
∫ T
0
[
−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t)) + f ′(ϕ(t))(ψ˙1(t)− ψ˙2(t) + y)
]
dt
+
∫ T
0
(r − f ′(ϕ(t)))d̺(t).
Assuming that there exists α¯ ∈ A¯x that is an optimal strategy, by the definition of U one has
sup
ψ∈Q[x,α¯]
[∫ τ
0
[−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t))]dt + rα¯[ψ](τ)
]
= U(x). (38)
Noting that U(ϕ(τ)) = U(0) = 0, we have by equations (38) and (37) applied to f = U and
T = τ ,
sup
ψ∈Q[x,α¯]
{∫ T
0
[
−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t)) + U ′(ϕ(t))(ψ˙1(t)− ψ˙2(t) + y)
]
dt (39)
+
∫ T
0
(r − U ′(ϕ(t)))dα¯[ψ](t)
}
= 0.
This gives rise to the following equation in the state variable, namely
max
p,q∈R
min
{
− c1p2 − c2q2 + h(x) + f ′(x)(p − q + y), r − f ′(x)
}
= 0. (40)
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The maximum above is achieved by (p, q) = (rf ′(x)/(2c1), rf
′(x)/(2c2)) and thus we obtain
[The Bellman equation] max
{
Lf ′(x)− h(x),Hf ′(x)
}
= 0, (41)
where L and H denote the operators
Lp = − 1
4c
p2 − yp, Hp = p− r, p ∈ R.
As suggested by the way that (41) is derived from the dynamic description (39), rejections
should take place at times when the state belongs to the part of the space where HU ′ =
0. Heuristically, it is plausible that rejections should occur only when the state exceeds a
threshold, and so it is to be expected that first and second arguments on the l.h.s. of equation
(41) vanish for x < β and x > β, respectively, where β is the free boundary point. This also
suggests that the minimizer plays optimally by selecting a β-barrier strategy.
To get information on the free boundary point of (41), note that LU ′ − h = HU ′ = 0 has
to hold at this point (at least in case when the solution is C1). We thus let the free boundary
point, β0, be defined as the unique solution β of the equation
r2
4c
+ ry + h(β) = 0, (42)
in case it exists.
Note that there exists a unique solution in case r2/(4c) + ry + h(0) ≤ 0 and r2/(4c) +
ry + h(D) ≥ 0, as follows from the assumption that h is strictly increasing. Otherwise,
equation (42) has no solution. When r2/(4c) + ry + h(D) < 0 we define β0 = D. In case
r2/(4c) + ry + h(0) = r2/(4c) + ry > 0 Lemma 3.1 tells us that the value function is infinite
and there is no need to define β0. Thus
β0 =


h−1
(−r2
4c
− ry
)
, −h(D) ≤ r
2
4c
+ ry ≤ −h(0),
D,
r2
4c
+ ry < −h(D).
(43)
As for a solution to the Bellman equation, we let g : [0,D]→ R be defined by
g(x) =


∫ x
0
2c
(
− y −
√
y2 − h(u)
c
)
du, 0 ≤ x ≤ β0,
g(β0) + r(x− β0), β0 < x ≤ D,
where in the case β0 = D, g is defined on [0,D] through the first line alone. Then the expression
under the root is always positive. To see this notice that from the discussion above and the
definition of β0 it follows that in case −y ≥ r/(4c) one has r2/(4c)+ ry+h(β0) ≤ 0. By simple
algebraic manipulation it follows that
(r/(2
√
c) + y
√
c)2 − y2c+ h(β0) = r2/(4c) + ry + h(β0) ≤ 0,
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which yields y2 − h(β0)/c ≥ 0. By the monotonicity of h it follows that for every u ∈ [0, β0]
one has y2 − h(u)/c ≥ 0.
Moreover, g satisfies the boundary condition g(0) = 0 and it is easy to check that it is
continuously differentiable on (0, β0) and on (β0,D) (and continuous on all of [0,D]) and
satisfies on these two intervals the two parts of the Bellman equation, namely Lg′−h = 0 and
Hg′ = 0, respectively. Thus if β0 = D then g solves the Bellman equation in a classical sense.
However, if β0 < D it may occur that g is not differentiable at β0. Specifically, when β0 < D,
g is not differentiable at β0 if and only if
r
4c
≤ −y <
( r
4c
+
h(D)
r
)
∧ r
2c
(44)
Moreover, under (44), the left- and right-derivative at β0 satisfy g
′
L(β0) < g
′
R(β0). Although
g is not always a classical solution to the Bellman equation, we will prove in the next section
that it is a viscosity solution (suitably defined) to that equation.
3.4 Viscosity solutions
In this section we consider the Bellman equation (41) in viscosity sense and characterize the
value function U of the hitting time game as the unique solution of that equation, with suitable
boundary conditions. The equality U = g is finally obtained when we prove, in the next section,
that g also solves the Bellman equation.
For a set B ⊂ R denote by B its closure.
Definition 3.2 [Viscosity solution]
i. For B = (0,D) or B = (0,D], a continuous function f : [0,D]→ R is said to be a viscosity
supersolution (resp., subsolution) of (41) on B if for every x ∈ B and every φ ∈ C1([0,D],R)
for which f − φ has a global minimum (maximum) on B at x one has
max
{
Lφ′(x)− h(x),Hφ′(x)
}
≥ 0 (≤ 0).
ii. A function f : [0,D]→ R is said to be a viscosity solution of (41) on [0,D] if it is a viscosity
subsolution of (41) on (0,D), a viscosity supersolution of (41) on (0,D], and f(0) = 0.
The definition accounts for a Dirichlet boundary condition at 0 as well as a state constraint
boundary condition at D, consisting of the requirement that f is a supersolution up to the
boundary point D (see Section IV.5 of [5]).
Theorem 3.1 The value function U is the unique viscosity solution of (41) on [0,D].
The proof is performed in two steps: we first show that U satisfies the Bellman equation
and then prove uniqueness.
Proof that U is a viscosity solution: By Lemma 3.1 and the equality U = V established in
Proposition 3.1, U is continuous and null at zero. It remains to prove that U is a subsolution
on (0,D) and a supersolution on (0,D].
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Subsolution on (0,D): Fix x ∈ (0,D) and let φ ∈ C1([0,D],R) be such that U − φ has a
global maximum at x. We can assume w.l.o.g. that U(x) = φ(x). Thus U ≤ φ on [0,D]. We
need to show that
Lφ′(x)− h(x) ≤ 0 (45)
and
Hφ′(x) ≤ 0. (46)
Consider δ > 0 such that x− δ ∈ [0,D]. The proof of (46) is based on the inequality U(x) −
U(x − δ) ≤ rδ, that is an extension of the two-sided inequality stated in Lemma 3.1. Let us
show this inequality. Given a strategy α¯ ∈ A¯x−δ let α˜ ∈ A¯x be defined as α˜[ψ] = δ + α¯[ψ].
Then the responses of the two strategies to ψ are related to each other by ϕ˜ = ϕ¯ and ˜̺ = ¯̺+δ.
As a result,
c¯(x, ψ, α˜[ψ]) = c¯(x− δ, ψ, α¯[ψ]) + rδ.
Hence U(x) ≤ supψ c¯(x−δ, ψ, α¯[ψ])+rδ and since α¯ is arbitrary, we have U(x) ≤ U(x−δ)+rδ.
Therefore φ(x)− φ(x− δ) ≤ U(x)− U(x− δ) ≤ rδ, establishing (46).
To prove (45) we let δ > 0 be such that 0 < x− δ < x+ δ < D, define
τδ := δ ∧ inf{t ≥ 0 : |ϕ(t)− x| ≥ δ} (47)
and use the dynamic programming principle (DPP), that states
U(x) = inf
α¯∈A¯x
sup
ψ∈Q[x,α¯δ]
[∫ τδ
0
(−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t)))dt + rα¯[ψ](τδ) + U(ϕ(τδ))
]
.
Consider a strategy α¯ with the property that for every ψ ∈ Q[x, α¯δ ] and every t ∈ [0, τδ] one
has α¯[ψ](t) = 0. By the chain rule,
U(x) = φ(x) = −
∫ τδ
0
φ′(ϕ(t))(ψ˙1(t)− ψ˙2(t) + y)dt+ φ(ϕ(τδ)).
Using the DPP, the inequality U ≤ φ, and the above display, we obtain
U(x) ≤ sup
ψ∈Q[x,α¯δ]
[∫ τδ
0
(−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t)))dt + U(ϕ(τδ))
]
≤ sup
ψ∈Q[x,α¯δ]
[∫ τδ
0
(−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t)))dt + φ(ϕ(τδ))
]
= sup
ψ∈Q[x,α¯δ]
[
φ(x) +
∫ τδ
0
(−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t))
+ φ′(ϕ(t))(ψ˙1(t)− ψ˙2(t) + y))dt
]
.
Recalling that U(x) = φ(x), we have
sup
ψ∈Q[x,α¯δ]
∫ τδ
0
(−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t))) + φ′(ϕ(t))(ψ˙1(t)− ψ˙2(t) + y))dt ≥ 0
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for every δ > 0. Hence
sup
ψ˙1(0),ψ˙2(0)∈R
[
−c1(ψ˙1)2(0) − c2(ψ˙2)2(0) + h(x) + φ′(x)(ψ˙1(0) − ψ˙2(0) + y)
]
≥ 0. (48)
The maximum in (48) is achieved by (ψ˙1(0), ψ˙2(0))∗ = (φ′(x)/(2c1), φ
′(x)/(2c1)) and equals
−Lφ′(x) + h(x), and (45) follows.
Supersolution on (0,D]: Fix x ∈ (0,D] and let φ ∈ C1([0,D],R) be such that U − φ has a
global minimum at x. Assume w.l.o.g. that U(x) = φ(x). Thus U ≥ φ on [0,D]. We need to
show that either
Lφ′(x)− h(x) ≥ 0 (49)
or
Hφ′(x) ≥ 0. (50)
Arguing by contradiction, assume that neither of the above inequalities hold. Then one can
find ε > 0 such that
Hφ′ ≤ −2ε and Lφ′ − h ≤ −2ε (51)
hold on Bδ(x) := {ξ ∈ [0,D] : |x− ξ| ≤ δ}. Denote ψx(t) = (φ′(x)t/(2c1), φ′(x)t/(2c1)), t ≥ 0.
Recall the definition of τδ from (47). Let A¯x(δ) denote the collection of strategies α¯ ∈ A¯x
that have the property ϕ(τδ) ∈ Bδ(x) for all ψ, where ϕ denotes the dynamics under ψ and α¯.
Pick an arbitrary α¯x ∈ A¯x(δ) and denote ̺x = α¯x[ψx]. The associated dynamics are given by
ϕx = x+ y ·+ψ1x−ψ1x− ̺x. Let τδ be as in (47) with ϕ = ϕx. An application of the chain rule
gives
φ(ϕx(τδ))− φ(x) (52)
= −
∫ τδ
0
(−c1(ψ˙1x)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2x)2(t) + h(ϕx(t))dt− r̺x(τδ)
+
∫ τδ
0
(−c1(ψ˙1x)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2x)2(t) + h(ϕx(t)) + φ′(ϕx(t))(ψ˙1x(t)− ψ˙1x(t) + y))dt
+
∫
[0,τδ]
(r − φ′(ϕx(t)))d̺x(t).
We will bound from below the last three terms on the r.h.s. of (52). By (51), the definition of
ψx, and the continuity of the functions φ
′ and h it follows that there is sufficiently small δ > 0
such that for every t ∈ [0, τδ ] one has
− c1(ψ˙1x)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2x)2(t) + h(ϕx(t)) + φ′(ϕx(t))(ψ˙1x(t)− ψ˙1x(t) + y)
≥ −c1(ψ˙1x)2(0)− c2(ψ˙2x)2(0) + h(ϕx(0)) + φ′(ϕx(0))(ψ˙1x(0) − ψ˙1x(0) + y)− ε
= −Lφ′(ϕx(0)) + h(ϕx(0))− ε = −Lφ′(x) + h(x) − ε ≥ ε,
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where the first equality follows by the definition of ψx and by (40). Therefore the second term
in (52) is bounded below by ετδ. By using similar arguments it follows from (51) that for
sufficiently small δ ∫
[0,τδ]
(r − φ′(ϕx(t)))d̺x(t) ≥ ε̺x(τδ).
Using the last two inequalities in (52), we obtain
φ(ϕx(τδ))− φ(x)
≥ −
∫ τδ
0
(−c1(ψ˙1x)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2x)2(t) + h(ϕx(t))dt− r̺x(τδ) + ε(τδ + ̺x(τδ)). (53)
We now show that the sum τδ + ̺x(τδ) is bounded below by C(x)δ, where C(x) is a positive
constant that depends solely on x. To this end, assume that τδ < δ (otherwise one may
simply take C(x) = 1). Therefore, by the definition of A¯x(δ) |ϕx(τδ) − x| = δ. Notice that if
̺x(τδ) ≤ δ/2 then in case y + ψ˙1x(t) − ψ˙2x(t) = y + φ′(x)/(2c) < 0 (resp., > 0), the function
yt+ ψ1x(t)− ψ2x(t) must pass −δ/2 (resp., 3δ/2) units over the time interval [0, τδ ]. Therefore
|yt+ 12cφ′(x)t| must pass at least δ/2 units. Hence τδ ≥ {2| 12cφ′(x) + y|}−1δ. Overall,1
τδ + ̺x(τδ) ≥ min
{
δ
2
,
1
2| 12cφ′(x) + y|
δ
}
=: C(x)δ,
and
φ(ϕx(τδ))− φ(x) ≥−
∫ τδ
0
(−c1(ψ˙1x)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2x)2(t) + h(ϕx(t))dt− r̺x(τδ) + εC(x)δ. (54)
By the dynamic programming principle, using the fact τδ ≤ τ , it follows that
U(x) = inf
α¯∈A¯x(δ)
sup
ψ∈Q[x,α¯]
[ ∫ τδ
0
[−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t))]dt + rα¯[ψ](τδ) + U(ϕ(τδ))
]
≥ inf
α¯∈A¯x
[ ∫ τδ
0
[−c1(ψ˙1x)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2x)2(t) + h(ϕx(t))]dt+ r̺x(τδ) + U(ϕx(τδ))
]
.
Therefore, there exists a strategy α∗ ∈ A¯x(δ) such that, denoting ̺∗x = α∗[ψx],
U(x) ≥
∫ τδ
0
[−c1(ψ˙1x)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2x)2(t) + h(ϕ∗x(t))]dt + r̺∗x(τδ) + U(ϕ∗x(τδ))−
1
2
εC(x)δ, (55)
where ϕ∗x = x+ t ·+ψ1x−ψ1x− ̺∗x. Recalling that α¯x ∈ A¯x(δ) is arbitrary, letting it be α∗, and
substituting ϕx = ϕ
∗
x in (54), it follows from inequalities (54) and (55) that
φ(ϕ∗x(τδ))− U(ϕ∗x(τδ)) ≥
1
2
εC(x)δ,
which contradicts the fact that U ≥ φ.
1Note that the choice of C(x) is independent of the strategy α¯x.
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Proof of uniqueness of viscosity solutions: We prove uniqueness by the comparison
principle. Assume that v is a supersolution on (0,D] and u a subsolution on (0,D). We show
that u ≤ v.
Arguing by contradiction, let us assume to the contrary, that u 6≤ v. Then there exist
x ∈ [0,D] and δ ∈ (0, 1) such that u(x) − (1 + δ)v(x) > 0. Fix such δ. Fix also z ∈
argmax[0,D] [u− (1 + δ)v]. Since u(0) = v(0) = 0 it follows that z > 0.
For ε > 0 define the following test function
ξε(x, y) = u(x)− (1 + δ)v(y) −
(
x− y
ε
− (−1− z)
)2
− (y − z)2 x, y ∈ [0,D].
Note that z + ε (−1− z) is in [0,D] for every small enough ε. Also,
ξε (z + ε (−1− z) , z) ≥ u(z)− (1 + δ)v(z) −mod(Cε), (56)
where here and in what follows mod is the modulus of continuity of u and v, and C is the
constant 1 +D. We also have
ξε (x, y) ≤ u(x)− (1 + δ)v(x) + 2mod(|x− y|)−
(
x− y
ε
− (−1− z)
)2
− (y − z)2 . (57)
For each ε > 0 pick (xε, yε) ∈ argmax[0,D]2 [ξε (x, y)]. From equations (56) and (57), substi-
tuting (x, y) = (xε, yε) and using u(z)− (1 + δ)v(z) ≥ u(xε)− (1 + δ)v(xε), it follows that(
xε − yε
ε
− (−1− z)
)2
+ (yε − z)2 ≤ mod(Cε) + 2mod(|xε − yε|). (58)
The above yields two properties that are being used in the sequel.
(a) limε→∞ xε = limε→∞ yε = z.
(b) For every ε small enough one has xε < yε.
Property (a) follows since the r.h.s. of equation (58) is bounded above and therefore there is
m > 0 such that |xε − yε| < mε. This also yields that for sufficiently small ε the r.h.s. of (58)
is bounded above by z2. Therefore, |xε − yε − ε (−1− z) | ≤ εz. By these two inequalities it
follows that
xε ≤ yε + ε (−1− z) + εz ≤ yε − ε < yε,
which proves property (b).
Now consider the maps
φu(x) := (1 + δ)v(yε) +
(
x− yε
ε
− (−1− z)
)2
+ (yε − z)2 , (59)
φv(y) :=
1
1 + δ
[
u(xε)−
(
xε − y
ε
− (−1− z)
)2
− (y − z)2
]
. (60)
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Then u−φu has a maximum at xε and v−φv has a minimum at yε. Note that by property (a)
and the fact z > 0, min(xε, yε) > 0 provided ε is small, and that by property (b), xε < D. As
a result, the definition of a viscosity subsolution on (0,D) and supersolution on (0,D] yields
max
{
Lφ′u(xε)− h(xε),Hφ′u(xε)
}
≤ 0 (61)
max
{
Lφ′v(yε)− h(yε),Hφ′v(yε)
}
≥ 0. (62)
Now,
φ′u(xε) =
2
ε
(
xε − yε
ε
− (−1− z)
)
(63)
φ′v(yε) =
1
1 + δ
[
2
ε
(
xε − yε
ε
− (−1− z)
)
− 2 (yε − z)
]
=
1
1 + δ
φ′u(xε)−
2
1 + δ
· (yε − z). (64)
By (61) it follows that Hφ′u(xε) ≤ 0, that is, φ′u(xε) ≤ r. Together with property (a) above
and equation (64) it follows that Hφ′v(yε) < 0. Therefore, (62) yields that
Lφ′v(yε)− h(yε) ≥ 0 (65)
We now claim that the sequence {φ′v(yε)}ε is positive and bounded away from zero. Denote
by q = lim φ′v(yε) = φ
′
v(z), where property (a) is used. Using again property (a) and (65) it
follows that L(q) − h(z) ≥ 0. Since z > 0, we get h(z) > 0, and therefore L(q) > 0, which
in turn yields q > 0. By considering a subsequent we may assume w.l.o.g. that {φ′v(yε)} is
bounded away from zero. Hence, for sufficiently small ε one has∣∣∣ 2
1 + δ
· (yε − z)
∣∣∣ ≤ δ
2(1 + δ)
φ′v(yε),
thanks to the fact that the l.h.s. converges to zero as ε → 0 by property (a). Together with
(64) we get that for sufficiently small ε
φ′v(yε) ≤
1
1 + δ
φ′u(xε) +
δ
2(1 + δ)
φ′v(yε). (66)
Together with the inequality φ′u(xε) ≤ r we get that
(1 +
δ
2
)φ′v(yε) ≤ φ′u(xε) ≤ r. (67)
If we show that for sufficiently small parameters ε and δ one has
L(r)− h(xε) > 0 (68)
and
L((1 + δ
2
)φ′v(yε))− h(xε) > 0 (69)
22
then by the concavity of p 7→ L(p) and (67)–(69) it follows that L(φ′u(xε)) − h(xε) > 0 in
contradiction to (61). We now prove that inequalities (68) and (69) hold.
Proof that inequality (68) holds: By property (b) and by the monotonicity of h it follows
that L(r) − h(xε) > L(r) − h(yε). Therefore, it is sufficient to show that L(r) − h(yε) ≥ 0.
To this end, assume to the contrary that L(r) − h(yε) < 0. Recall that from (67) one has
φ′v(yε) < r. Fix pε ∈ (φ′v(yε), r) sufficiently close to r such that L(pε)− h(yε) < 0. Then
max
{
L(pε)− h(yε),H(pε)
}
< 0 (70)
Denote b = minζ∈[yε,D](v(ζ) − pεζ) and consider the function φ(ζ) = pεζ + b, ζ ∈ [0,D]. Pick
zε ∈ [yε,D] for which v(zε) = φ(zε). By the definition of b one has v ≥ φ on [yε,D]. Moreover,
since pε > φ
′
v(yε) it follows that v ≥ φ in fact holds on a larger interval, namely on (yε−c,D] for
some c > 0. Thus we may consider φ as a test function in the definition of v as a supersolution
on (0,D], by which
max
{
L(pε)− h(zε),H(pε)
}
≥ 0.
This, the fact that zε ≥ yε, and the monotonicity of h give a contradiction to (70).
Proof that inequality (69) holds: From property (a), together with z > 0 we may assume
w.l.o.g. that for every ε one has yε > 0. Also recall that we assumed that φ
′
v(yε) > 0. Similarly
to (67), one may take sufficiently small ε such that
0 < φ′v(yε) < (1 +
δ
2
)φ′v(yε) < (1 +
2δ
3
)φ′v(yε) < r (71)
and consequently
0 < q < (1 +
δ
2
)q < (1 +
2δ
3
)q ≤ r, (72)
where the fact that q > 0 has been proved earlier. By taking ε→ 0 in (68) and (65) it follows
form the limits lim xε = lim yε = z (property (a)) and limφ
′
v(yε) = q that
L(q)− h(z) ≥ 0 and L(r)− h(z) ≥ 0. (73)
From (73) and (72) and the strict concavity of p 7→ L(p) it follows that L((1+ δ
2
)q)−h(z) > 0.
By the limits limxε = z and limφ
′
v(yε) = q it follows that for sufficiently small ε inequality
(69) holds. ✷
Explicit viscosity solution of the Bellman equation
We now prove that the function g is the value function. We do that by showing that g is a
viscosity solution of the Bellman equation, which admits a unique solution.
Theorem 3.2 The function g is a viscosity solution of (41) on [0,D].
Note that this result combined with Theorem 3.1 shows U = g.
Proof: One verifies directly that the function g satisfies, in the classical sense, Lg′ − h = 0
and Hg′ ≤ 0 on (0, β0), and (in case β0 < D) also Lg′ − h ≤ 0 and Hg′ = 0 on (β0,D). Also,
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if r/(2c) ≤ −y < r/(4c) + h(D)/r then as follows from Section 3.3 β0 < D and the function g
is differentiable at β0 and one can easily verify that Lg′(β0)−h(β0) = Hg′(β0) = 0. Moreover,
g(0) = 0. Hence it remains to verify the viscosity solution definition at the points β0 and D
only.
Subsolution for β0: The case r/(2c) ≤ −y < r/(4c) + h(D)/r was discussed before. We
analyze the two remaining cases −y ≥ r/(4c)+h(D)/r and r/(4c) ≤ −y < (r/(4c)+h(D)/r)∧
r/(2c). If −y ≥ r/(4c) + h(D)/r then as we saw in Section 3.3, β0 = D, and the subsolution
property need not be verified since by definition the viscosity subsolution property should be
verified only on the interval (0,D). If r/(4c) ≤ −y < (r/(4c) + h(D)/r) ∧ r/(2c) then as we
saw in Section 3.3, g′L(β0) < g
′
R(β0). Therefore, there is no function φ ∈ C1([0,D],R) such that
g − φ has a global maximum at β0, and the claim holds vacuously.
Supersolution for β0 and D: Fix x ∈ {β0,D}. Let φ ∈ C1([0,D],R) be such that g − φ has
a global minimum at x. We can assume w.l.o.g. that g(x) = φ(x). Thus, g ≥ φ on [0,D]. We
need to show that
Lφ′(x)− h(x) ≥ 0 (74)
or
Hφ′(x) ≥ 0. (75)
As before, we analyze the two cases −y ≥ r/(4c) + h(D)/r and r/(4c) ≤ −y < (r/(4c) +
h(D)/r) ∧ r/(2c). If r/(4c) ≤ −y < (r/(4c) + h(D)/r) ∧ r/(2c) then as was shown in Section
3.3 β0 < D, g
′
L(β0) < g
′
R(β0), and g
′(D) = r. For x = D (75) holds since φ′(D) ≥ g′(D). For
x = β0. Since g
′
L(β0) ≤ φ′(β0) ≤ g′R(β0) it follows that 2c(−y −
√
y2 − h(β0)/c) ≤ φ′(β0) ≤ r.
One can verify that
L(2c(−y −
√
y2 − h(β0)/c))− h(β0) ≥ 0 and Lr − h(β0) ≥ 0. (76)
From the above and by the concavity of L it follows that (74) holds.
If −y ≥ r/(4c) + h(D)/r then as was shown in Section 3.3 β0 = D. If φ′(β0) ≥ r then (75)
holds. If φ′(β0) ≤ r then 2c(−y −
√
y2 − h(β0)/c) = g′L(β0) ≤ φ′(β0) ≤ r and from (76) as
before it follows that (74) holds.
✷
3.5 Optimal strategy
The following theorem shows that the β0-barrier strategy is optimal. We defined the barrier
strategies only for the original game. The definition for the hitting time game is similar.
Definition 3.3 Fix (x, β) ∈ [0,D]2. The strategy α¯β ∈ A¯x is called a β-barrier strategy if for
every ψ ∈ Q[x, α¯γ ] one has (ϕ, 0, α¯β)(ψ) = Γ[0,γ](ψ) on the time interval [0, τ ].
To state the result let us add a piece of notation. Denote by J¯(x, α¯) the optimal cost
achieved by the maximizer in the hitting time game when the initial state is x and the minimizer
uses the strategy α¯ ∈ A¯x. That is,
J¯(x, α¯) := sup
ψ∈Q[x,α¯]
c¯(x, ψ, α¯[ψ]), x ∈ [0,D], α¯ ∈ Ax. (77)
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Theorem 3.3 Let α¯β0 be the β0-barrier strategy. For every x ∈ [0,D] one has g(x) =
J¯(x, α¯β0).
Proof: Recall that U = infA¯· J¯(·, α¯). Therefore, J(·, α¯β0) ≥ U . If we show that g ≥ J¯(·, α¯β0)
then together with Theorem 3.2 it will follow that U = g ≥ J¯(·, α¯β0), and so U = g = J¯(·, α¯β0).
Hence in what follows we shall prove that g ≥ J¯(·, α¯β0). By the definition of the β0-barrier
strategy and the function g it follows that for every x ∈ [β0,D] one has g(x) = g(β0)+r(x−β0)
and J¯(x, α¯β0) = J¯(β0, α¯β0)+r(x−β0). Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that g(x) ≥ J¯(x, α¯β0)
only for x ∈ [0, β0]. Apply the definition of J¯ for α¯ = α¯β0 , that is,
J¯(x, α¯β0) = sup
ψ∈Q[x,α¯β0 ]
c¯(x, ψ, α¯β0 [ψ]).
Then it is sufficient to show that for every x ∈ [0, β0] and every ψ ∈ Q[x, α¯β0 ] one has
c¯(x, ψ, α¯β0 [ψ]) =
∫ τ
0
[−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t))]dt + r̺(τ) ≤ g(x),
where ̺ = α¯β0 [ψ] and ϕ(t) = x+ yt+ ψ
1(t)− ψ2(t)− ̺(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ τ .
Fix such x and ψ. Applying the chain rule to g gives2∫ τ
0
[−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t))]dt + r̺(τ) (78)
≤
∫ τ
0
[−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t))]dt + r̺(τ) + g(ϕ(τ))
= g(x) +
∫ τ
0
[−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t)) + (ψ˙1(t)− ψ˙2(t) + y)g′(ϕ(t))]dt
+
∫ τ
0
[r − g′(ϕ(t))]d̺(t)
≤ g(x) +
∫ τ
0
[r − g′(β0)]d̺(t),
where we write g′(β0) for g
′
L(β0). The last inequality above holds due to the fact that for every
0 ≤ t ≤ τ one has ϕ(t) ∈ [0, β0] and
max
p,q∈R
[−c1p2(t)− c2q2 + h(ϕ(t)) + (p − q + y)g′(ϕ(t))] = −L(g′(ϕ(t)) + h(ϕ(t)),
and the r.h.s. above equals zero by the choice of g.
Next, recall that the measure d̺ charges only times t at which {ϕ(t) = β0}. We analyze the
last term in (78) separately for r/(2c) + y ≤ 0 and r/(2c) + y > 0. Recall by Section 3.3 that
in case r/(2c)+ y ≤ 0, the function g is differentiable at β0 and satisfies g′(β0) = r. Therefore,∫ τ
0 [r − g′(β0)]d̺(t) = 0 and from (78) it follows that g(x) ≥ J¯(x, α¯β0).
In case r/(2c) + y > 0 the above argument does not hold since g′L(β0) < g
′
R(β0) = r.
Hence we refine the proof. We will construct a sequence of functions {gδ}δ ⊂ C1([0,D],R+),
2Notice that since x ≤ β0, and by the definition of the β0-barrier strategy the dynamics admit no jumps.
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that converges uniformly to g as δ → 0 with the property that for every x ∈ [0, β0] and every
ψ ∈ Q[x, α¯β0 ] one has∫ τ
0
[−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t))]dt + r̺(τ) ≤ gδ(x), (79)
by which the result thus follows upon taking δ → 0.
Lemma 3.2 There exists a sequence of functions {gδ}δ that satisfies the following conditions
(c1) {gδ}δ ⊂ C1([0,D],R+).
(c2) g′δ(β0) = g
′
R(β0) = r.
(c3) For every x ∈ [0, β0] one has L(g′δ(x))− h(x) ≥ 0.
(c4) limδ→0 supx∈[0,D] |gδ(x)− g(x)| = 0.
The proof appears below. To complete the proof of the theorem, note by condition (c1) that
one can apply the chain rule to gδ, and as in (78),∫ τ
0
[−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t))]dt + r̺(τ)
≤
∫ τ
0
[−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t))]dt + r̺(τ) + gδ(ϕ(τ))
= gδ(x) +
∫ τ
0
[−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t)) + (ψ˙1(t)− ψ˙2(t) + y)g′δ(ϕ(t))]dt
+
∫ τ
0
[r − g′δ(ϕ(t))]d̺(t)
≤ gδ(x) +
∫ τ
0
[−L(g′δ(ϕ(t))) + h(ϕ(t))]dt +
∫ τ
0
[r − g′δ(β0)]d̺(t).
From conditions (c3) and (c2) we get that the second term on the r.h.s. is nonpositive and the
third one equals zero, and therefore (79) holds. ✷
Proof of Lemma 3.2: In this proof we write g′(β0) for g
′
L(β0). Fix 0 < δ < β0. Recall that
the function g is not differentiable (only) at β0 and satisfies g
′
L(β0) < g
′
R(β0) = r. The idea
of the proof is to construct a smooth function gδ that is close to g and such that gδ = g on
[0, xδ ] where xδ is a little smaller than β0. The function gδ increases on the interval [xδ, β0]
and satisfies g′δ(β0) = g
′
R(β0) = r. On [β0,D] it is affine with slope r. We start with a
linear interpolation. Let lδ be the linear interpolation between the two-dimensional points
(β0 − δ, g′(β0 − δ)) and (β0, g′R(β0)). That is lδ(x) = g′(β0 − δ) + (x− (β0 − δ))g
′
R(β0)−g
′(β0−δ)
δ .
Define xδ := argmax{x ∈ [β0 − δ, β0] : lδ(x) = g′(x)}. Since lδ and g′ are continuous and since
lδ(β0 − δ) = g′(β0 − δ) and lδ(β0) > g′L(β0) it follows that β0 − δ ≤ xδ < β0. Define
gδ(x) :=


g(x) 0 ≤ x ≤ xδ,
g(xδ) +
∫ x
xδ
lδ(u)du xδ < x ≤ β0,
gδ(β0) + r(x− β0) β0 < x ≤ D.
One can easily verify that (c1) and (c2) hold. Condition (c3) holds trivially on [0, xδ ] since
on this interval gδ = g and we chose g to satisfy L(g′(x)) − h(x) = 0 on [0, β0). We now
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turn to the interval (xδ, β0]. Fix x ∈ (xδ, β0]. According to the definition of xδ one has
g′δ(x) = lδ(x) > g
′(x). Also, g′δ(x) ≤ g′R(β0) = r. Altogether,
g′(x) < g′δ(x) ≤ r. (80)
We claim that L(g′δ(x))− h(x) ≥ 0. To this end, we show that
L(g′(x))− h(x) = 0 and L(r)− h(x) ≥ 0, x ∈ (xδ, β0] (81)
and use inequality (80) and the concavity of L to deduce that (c3) holds. We already showed
that the first condition of (81) holds. As for the second, notice that since h is increasing, one
has L(r)− h(x) ≥ L(r)− h(β0) ≥ 0, where the last inequality follows by the definition of β0.
To verify (c4) it is sufficient to show that limδ→0 supx∈[xδ,β0] |gδ(x) − g(x)| = 0. Since
g′δ(x)− g′(x) = lδ(x)− g′(x) > 0 for every x ∈ [xδ, β0] it follows that gδ(x)− g(x) increases on
[xδ, β0], and therefore we need only to prove that limδ→0(gδ(β0)− g(β0)) = 0. This condition
indeed holds, due to the fact that gδ(β0) = g(xδ) +
∫ β0
xδ
lδ(u)du, limδ→0 xδ = β0, and lδ is
bounded. ✷
As an immediate consequence we obtain an analogous result for the original game.
Theorem 3.4 Let αβ0 be the β0-barrier strategy in the original game. For every x ∈ [0,D]
one has g(x) = J(x, αβ0) := supψ∈P2,T∈R+ c(x, T, ψ, αβ0 [ψ]).
Proof: In the proof of Theorem 3.3, replace the set Q[x, α¯β0 ] by P2 and the hitting time τ by
any time T ∈ R+ to obtain
g(x) = J(x, αβ0) = sup
ψ∈P2,T∈R+
c(x, T, ψ, αβ0 [ψ]).
✷
3.6 Further properties of the game
This section is concerned with two particular controls for the maximizer, that besides being
interesting by their own right, play an important role in the analysis of the asymptotic stochas-
tic control problem in the forthcoming paper [2]. The first control regards the behavior of the
maximizer when the dynamics are above the free boundary point β0, and is used to show that
the property of the β0-barrier policy, by which the dynamics must initially jump from x > β0 to
β0, is necessary for optimality of the strategy (Subsection 3.6.1). The second control presented
(Subsection 3.6.2) is the optimal response to the β0-barrier strategy. Finally, in the case when
h is convex, the latter control is shown (in Subsection 3.6.3) to correspond to a saddle point
for the game. Specifically, by choosing this control, the maximizer can force a payoff of at least
U(x) regardless of the strategy used by the minimizer.
3.6.1 Dynamics outside the free boundary
For initial condition x > β0, the optimal strategy that we have identified dictates that the
dynamics make a jump to the point β0 at time zero. The initial (i.e., at time zero) cost
associated with this jump is r(x − β0). We will show that any strategy that does not make
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such an initial jump is suboptimal. We do so by identifying a control that, if used by the
maximizing player, assures that under any strategy that does not perform such a jump, a
larger cost is incurred up to the first time β0 is reached.
The precise formulation of this requires an additional parameter, δ > 0, that can be made
arbitrarily small. Fix x > β0. Let δ > 0 be such that x > β0 + δ. Fix a strategy α¯ ∈ A¯x.
Consider the control3
ψ(t) = ψδ(t) :=
{
(rt/(2c1),−rt/(2c2)) 0 ≤ t < T,
(rT/(2c2), rT/(2c2)) t ≥ T, (82)
where T = Tδ :=
r(D−β0)
h(β0+δ)−h(β0)
. Denote also ϕα¯ := ϕ[x, ψ, α¯[ψ]] and let
τ = τα¯,δ := inf{t ≥ 0 : ϕα¯(t) ≤ β0 + δ}
be the first time that the dynamics cross β0 + δ.
Proposition 3.2 If τ > 0 then one has∫ τ
0
h(ϕα¯(t))dt + rα¯[ψ](τ) − I(τ, ψ) > r(x− (β0 + δ)).
Notice that the l.h.s. of the above is the cost incurred up to time τ , whereas the r.h.s. corresponds
to cost of rejecting at time zero.
Proof of Proposition 3.2: We analyze separately the cases 0 < τ ≤ T and τ > T . In case
τ < T the cost until time τ is given by∫ τ
0
[−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2δ )2(t) + h(ϕ(t))]dt + r̺(τ)
≥ (h(β0 + δ)− r
2
4c
)τ + r̺(τ) (83)
≥ r(x− β0 − δ) + (r
2
4c
+ ry + h(β0))τ + (h(β0 + δ)− h(β0))τ (84)
= r(x− β0 − δ) + (h(β0 + δ)− h(β0))τ. (85)
Above, inequality (83) follows since on the time interval [0, τ) one has ϕ > β0 + δ and since h
is increasing. Inequality (84) follows since β0+ δ ≥ ϕ(τ) = x+( r2c + y)τ − ̺(τ). Equation (85)
follows since in case β0 < D one has r
2/(4c) + ry + h(β0) = 0 by (43). Since h is increasing
and τ > 0, the expression in (85) is strictly greater than r(x− (β0 + δ)).
In case τ > T one has ψ˙(t) = (0, 0) on the time interval [T, τ ]. Therefore, the cost incurred
until τ is at least
∫ T
0 [−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2δ )2(t) + h(ϕ(t))]dt+ r̺(T ). By similar arguments one
has that∫ T
0
[−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t))]dt + r̺(T ) ≥ (h(β0 + δ)− r
2
4c
)T + r̺(T )
≥ r(x− β0 − δ)− r(D − β0 − δ) + (r
2
4c
+ ry + h(β0))T + (h(β0 + δ)− h(β0))T
= r(x− β0 − δ) + rδ > r(x− β0 − δ).
✷
3Notice that ψδ ∈ Q[x, α¯].
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3.6.2 Optimal response to the barrier strategy
Recall that the β0-barrier strategy is optimal under our standing assumption −y ≥ r/(4c).
We now identify a control for the maximizer that is optimal when the minimizer uses the β0-
barrier strategy. More precisely, in case y2−h(β0)/c > 0 or x < β0 (resp., y2−h(β0)/c = 0 and
x = β0) we find an explicit expression for the maximizer’s optimal (resp., δ-optimal) control
and for the termination time.4
Throughout, it is assumed that x ∈ [0, β0] and that the maximizer uses the β0-barrier
strategy, α¯β0 . We use a constant δ that in case y
2 − h(β0)/c > 0 or x < β0 is set to zero, and
in case y2 − h(β0) = 0 and x = β0 is assumed to satisfy 0 < δ ≤ x.
In this subsection we assume that h is also Lipschitz continuous on [0,D]. Denote τ˜ =
δ +
∫ x+yδ
0 1/
√
y2 − h(ξ)/c dξ and let ω ∈ C0([0, τ˜ ],R) ∩ C1([δ, τ˜ ],R) be defined as 0 on [0, δ]
and let it be the unique solution of
ω˙(t) = −y −
√
y2 − h((x+ yt+ ω(t)) ∧ (x+ yδ))/c, t ∈ [δ, τ˜ ]. (86)
Indeed, existence and uniqueness will follow from the Picard-Lindelo¨f theorem once we show
that that the r.h.s. of (86) is Lipschitz with respect to ω. This follows since h is assumed
Lipschitz, and since the expression under the root sign is bounded away from zero. For the
last statement, recall that we assumed that δ = 0 in case y2 − h(β0)/c > 0 or x < β0 and
0 < δ < x in case y2 − h(β0)/c = 0 and x = β0. Hence, y2 − h(x+ yδ)/c > 0. Using moreover
that h is increasing we get that y2−h((x+ yt+ω(t))∧ (x+ yδ))/c is bounded away from zero.
Set
ψ(t) :=
(
c
c1
ω(t),
−c
c2
ω(t)
)
, t ∈ [0, τ˜ ]. (87)
Theorem 3.5 If y2 − h(β0)/c > 0 or x < β0 then c¯(x, ψ, α¯β0 [ψ]) = U(x). If y2 − h(β0)/c = 0
and x = β0 then there is a positive constant C such that for every 0 < δ ≤ x one has
|c¯(x, ψ, α¯β0 [ψ]) − U(x)| ≤ Cδ. Moreover, for every δ ≥ 0 the termination time of the game is
τ = τ˜ .
Proof: Notice that by the optimality of α¯β0 it follows that for every δ ≥ 0 one has U(x) =
supψ˜∈Q[x,α¯β0 ]
c¯(x, ψ˜, α¯β0 [ψ˜]) ≥ c¯(x, ψ, α¯β0 [ψ]). Therefore, in order to prove the theorem it is
sufficient to prove that c¯(x, ψ, α¯β0 [ψ]) ≥ U(x) − Cδ where δ = 0 in case y2 − h(β0)/c > 0 or
x < β0 and 0 < δ < x in case y
2−h(β0)/c = 0 and x = β0. To this end, it is sufficient to show
that ψ ∈ Q2[x, α¯β0 ] and that the cost until the first hitting time, τ , is bounded below by g.
That is
c¯(x, ψ, α¯[ψ]) =
∫ τ
0
[−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t))]dt + r̺(τ) ≥ g(x), (88)
where ̺ = α¯β0 [ψ] and ϕ(t) = x+ yt+ ψ
1(t)− ψ2(t)− ̺(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ τ . We do that by showing
that ψ satisfies the following three conditions.
(a) For every 0 ≤ t ≤ τ one has ϕ(t) ∈ [0, β0].
4One can show that y2−h(β0)/c ≥ 0 and that equality holds if and only if−y = r/(2c) and−y ≤ r/c+h(D)/r.
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(b) ψ ∈ Q2[x, α¯β0 ].
(c) For every δ ≤ t ≤ τ one has
−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t)) + (ψ˙1(t)− ψ˙2(t) + y)g′(ϕ(t)) = 0.
Before proving (a)–(c) let us show that they are sufficient for (88). Condition (a) is needed
for g′(ϕ(·)) to be well-defined, where one uses the convention g′(β0) = g′L(β0). From condition
(b) it follows that g(ϕ(τ)) = 0. As a result, we can apply the chain rule to g, as in (37). Thus∫ τ
0
[−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t))]dt + r̺(τ) + g(ϕ(τ))
= g(x) +
∫ δ
0
[−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t)) + (ψ˙1(t)− ψ˙2(t) + y)g′(ϕ(t))]dt
+
∫ τ
δ
[−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t)) + (ψ˙1(t)− ψ˙2(t) + y)g′(ϕ(t))]dt
+
∫ τ
0
[r − g′(ϕ(t))]d(̺)(t).
From condition (c) together with the fact that r ≥ g′ it follows that∫ τ
0
[−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t))]dt + r̺(τ) (89)
≥ g(x) +
∫ δ
0
[−c1(ψ˙1)2(t)− c2(ψ˙2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t)) + (ψ˙1(t)− ψ˙2(t) + y)g′(ϕ(t))]dt.
Recall that for every t ∈ [0, δ] one has ω˙(t) = 0 and therefore ψ(·) = (0, 0) on that time interval.
Moreover, the functions h and g are both bounded. Therefore, the integral on the r.h.s. of (89)
is bounded below by −Cδ, where C is a positive constant independent of δ. Hence, we proved
that c(x, ψ, α¯β0 [ψ]) ≥ U(x)− Cδ.
We now show that ψ satisfies conditions (a)–(c). Hereafter, we assume that t ≥ δ. Since
y + ω˙(t) ≤ 0 it follows that x + yt+ ω(t) is nonincreasing in t and therefore x + yt+ ω(t) ≤
x + yδ ≤ β0, since moreover, ω = ψ1 − ψ2 it follows that ϕ(t) = x + yt + ω(t) and condition
(a) holds. Since h is increasing we get that
y + ω˙(t) ≤ −
√
y2 − h(x+ yδ)/c < 0.
That is, ϕ(·) = x + y · +ω(·) is (strictly) decreasing with a slope that is bounded above by a
negative number and therefore ϕ reaches zero at a finite time and (b) holds. Condition (c)
follows by substitution of ψ and g.
We now turn to the termination time of the game. Recall that for every 0 ≤ t ≤ τ one has
ϕ(t) ∈ [0, β0]. Also, recall that ϕ(·) = x+ y ·+ω(·) and therefore,
τ = inf{t ≥ 0 : ϕ(t) = 0} = inf{t ≥ 0 : x+ yt+ ω(t) = 0}.
As mentioned earlier, the map ϕ : [0, τ ] → [0, x] is strictly decreasing. Therefore, ϕ has an
inverse function ϕ−1 : [0, x]→ [0, τ ]. Its derivative satisfies
(ϕ−1)′(ξ) =
1
ϕ′(ϕ−1(ξ))
,
30
and more explicitly
(ϕ−1)′(ξ) :=
{ −1/√y2 − h(ξ)/c 0 ≤ ξ ≤ x+ yδ,
1/y x+ yδ ≤ ξ ≤ x. (90)
Since ϕ−1(0) = τ and ϕ−1(x) = 0 it follows that
τ = ϕ−1(0)− ϕ−1(x) = −
∫ x
0
(ϕ−1)′(ξ)dξ = δ +
∫ x+yδ
0
1/
√
y2 − h(ξ)/c dξ.
✷
3.6.3 The case of convex h: a saddle point property
We now present a saddle point property of the game in case when h is a convex function and
twice continuously differentiable, namely that the maximizer can force a payoff of at least U(x)
by choosing the control ψ defined in the previous subsection. The result is only concerned with
the case x < β0. Note that by the convention regarding the constant δ, we take here δ = 0.
Proposition 3.3 Fix x ∈ [0, β0) and assume h is a convex function. Then for every ̺ ∈ E
one has c¯(x, ψ, ̺) ≥ U(x).
Proof: We prove the proposition in two steps. First, we show that if the minimizer uses a
control ̺ that has p rejections in total then it is optimal for it to reject the amount p at time
zero. Then we argue that, for any amount p rejected at time zero, the cost is bounded below
by U(x).
Step 1. Let ̺ ∈ E . Denote by p := ̺(τ), where τ = τ(x, ψ, ̺). Define the modified path ̺p as
̺p(t) = p for all t ≥ 0. We will show that
c¯(x, ψ, ̺) ≥ c¯(x, ψ, ̺p). (91)
To this end, recall the definition of ψ from (87), which yields that x + y · +ψ1(·) − ψ2(·) is
strictly decreasing and therefore τ(x, ψ, ̺) = τ(x, ψ, ̺p) = T , where
T := inf{t ≥ 0 : x+ yt+ ψ1(t)− ψ2(t) = p}. (92)
Therefore
c¯(x, ψ, ̺) =
∫ T
0
[−c1(ψ1)2(t)− c1(ψ2)2(t) + h(x+ yt+ ψ1(t)− ψ2(t)− ̺(t))]dt+ rp,
and c¯(x, ψ, ̺p) is given by a similar expression with ̺(t) replaced by p. Since h is increasing,
(91) follows.
Step 2. Denote ϕ(t) = x+yt+ψ1(t)−ψ2(t). Note that this is the dynamics under the control
ψ and the β0-barrier strategy, because ̺ = 0 under that strategy for x < β0. Consider any
p ∈ [0, x] and recall the notation ̺p from the previous paragraph. Notice that ϕ[x, ψ, ̺p] = ϕ−p.
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Denote F (p) = c¯(x, ψ, ̺p). The result will follow once we show that F (p) ≥ F (0) = g(x). To
this end, write T (p) for the quantity T of (92), to emphasize the p-dependence. Then
F (p) =
∫ T (p)
0
[−c1(ψ1)2(t)− c1(ψ2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t) − p)]dt+ rp
=
∫ T (p)
0
[−c1(ψ1)2(t)− c1(ψ2)2(t) + h(ϕ(t))]dt
−
∫ T (p)
0
[h(ϕ(t)) − h(ϕ(t) − p)]dt+ rp
= g(x) − g(p)−
∫ T (p)
0
[h(ϕ(t)) − h(ϕ(t) − p)]dt+ rp.
The last equality follows since
g(x) =
∫ T (p)
0
[−c1(ψ1)2(t)− c1(ψ2)2(t) + h(x+ yt+ ψ1(t)− ψ2(t))]dt+ g(p),
which in turn follows since both sides of the last equation represents the cost when both
players play optimally where we use a DPP argument. Indeed, the integral is the cost under
the dynamics hits p and g(p) is the cost when the initial state is p.
Note that F (0) = g(x). Thus to prove that F (p) ≥ g(x) for every p ∈ [0, x] it suffices to show
that F ′ ≥ 0 on [0, x]. To this end, first notice that T = ϕ−1 and that T ′(·) = −1/√y2 − h(·)/c,
see (90). By direct calculations it follows that
F ′(p) = −g′(p)− T ′(p)h(p) −
∫ T (p)
0
h′(ϕ(t)− p)dt+ r.
By substituting q = ϕ(t) on the integral on the r.h.s. of the we get∫ T (p)
0
h′(ϕ(t) − p)dt =
∫ p
x
h′(q − p)/(ϕ)′(ϕ−1(q)) dq =
∫ p
x
h′(q − p)T ′(q) dq
=
∫ x
p
h′(q − p)/
√
y2 − h(q)/c dq.
Using moreover the convexity of h it follows that
F ′(p) ≥ −g′(p)− T ′(p)h(p) −
∫ x
p
h′(q)/
√
y2 − h(q)/c dq + r = −T ′(p)h(p) − g′(x) + r ≥ 0.
The equality above follows since h′(q)/
√
y2 − h(q)/c = g′′(q). The last inequality follows since
r ≥ g′(x) and since T ′(p) is negative. ✷
A Appendix
State space collapse for the multidimensional DG
The scaled processes (A˜n, S˜n) are assumed to satisfy a moderate deviation principle. To express
this assumption, let Jk, k = 1, 2, be functions on D([0, T ],RI) defined as follows. For ψk =
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(ψk1 , . . . , ψ
k
I ) ∈ D([0, T ],RI),
Jk(T, ψ
k) :=
{ ∑I
i=1 ci,k
∫ T
0 (ψ˙
k
i )
2(s)ds if all ψki ∈ AC0([0, T ],R),
∞ otherwise, (93)
where
ci,1 =
1
2λiσ2i,IA
and ci,2 =
1
2µiσ2i,ST
, i ∈ I.
Let J(T, ψ) = J1(T, ψ
1) + J2(T, ψ
2) for ψ = (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ D([0, T ],R2I ).
We show that the multidimensional game can be reduced into a one dimensional game
in the sense that they both share the same value. Towards this, we will need to define the
components of the one dimensional cost function: the holding cost, rejection cost, and the rate
function. For w ∈ R+, denote
h(w) := inf{h · ξ : ξ ∈
I∏
i=1
[0,Di], θ · ξ = w}. (94)
By the convexity of the set
∏I
i=1[0,Di] it follows that h is convex. Moreover, h(w) ≥ 0 for
w ≥ 0 and equality holds if and only if w = 0. Therefore, h is strictly increasing. Let
r := min{r · q : q ∈ RI+, θ · q = 1}. (95)
As was shown in [4],
r = ri∗µi∗ := min{riµi : i ∈ I}.
For every T ∈ R+ and ψ = (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ P2 set I(T, ψ) = I1(T, ψ1) + I2(T, ψ2), where
Ik(T, ψ
k) := inf{Jk(T, ψk) : ψk ∈ PI , θ · ψk = ψk}, k = 1, 2. (96)
One can verify that
Ik(t, ψ
k) =
{
ck
∫ T
0 (ψ˙
k)2(s)ds if ψk ∈ AC0([0, T ],R),
∞ otherwise,
where
c1 :=
(
I∑
i=1
2ρiσ
2
i,IA
µi
)−1
, and c2 :=
(
I∑
i=1
2σ2i,ST
µi
)−1
.
Moreover, for every ψ = (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ P2 define the multidimensional path ψ
ψ
= (ψ1
ψ1
, ψ2
ψ2
) ∈
P2I by
ψ1
ψ1
:=
(
2ρ1σ
2
1,IA
µ1
, . . . ,
2ρnσ
2
n,IA
µn
)
c1ψ
1
and
ψ2
ψ2
:=
(
2σ21,ST
µ1
, . . . ,
2σ2n,ST
µn
)
c2ψ
2.
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Simple calculation yields that
θ · ψk
ψk
= ψk, k = 1, 2,
and that
J(T, ψ
ψ
) = I(T, ψ). (97)
Given x ∈∏Ii=1[0,Di], let x = θ · x. The one-dimensional value function is given by
VOD(x) = inf
α∈Ax
sup
ψ∈P2,T∈R+
(∫ T
0
h(ϕ(t))dt + rα1[ψ](T ) − J(T, ψ)
)
.
Theorem A.1 For every x ∈∏Ii=1[0,Di] one has VMD(x) = VOD(x).
Proof of Theorem A.1 Fix x. We prove the theorem by showing
VOD(x) ≤ VMD(x) (98)
and
VMD(x) ≥ VOD(x). (99)
We start by showing (98). Let α ∈ Ax. Define α ∈ Ax by
αk[(ψ
1, ψ2)] := θ · αk[(ψ1ψ1 , ψ2ψ2)], (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ P2, k = 1, 2.
The proof that α is admissible is straightforward and therefore omitted. Since (ψ1, ψ2) =
(θ · ψ1
ψ1
, θ · ψ2
ψ2
) we get that
c(x, T, ψ, α[ψ]) = c(x, T, (θ · ψ1
ψ1
, θ · ψ2
ψ2
), α[(θ · ψ1
ψ1
, θ · ψ2
ψ2
)]) (100)
Fix ψ ∈ P2 and let
ϕ(t) = x+ yt+ ψ1
ψ1
(t)− ψ2
ψ2
(t) + α1[ψψ](t)− α2[ψψ](t), t ≥ 0
be the dynamics associated with x, ψ
ψ
, and α[ψ
ψ
]. By the definitions of h and r (see (94),
(95)) and by (97) it follows that
h · ϕ(t) ≥ h(θ · ϕ(t)), t ≥ 0,
r · α2[ψψ](t) ≥ rθ · α2[ψψ](t), t ≥ 0,
and
I(T, ψ) = J(T, ψ
ψ
), T ≥ 0.
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Therefore,
c(x, T, (θ · ψ1
ψ1
, θ · ψ2
ψ2
), α[(θ · ψ1
ψ1
, θ · ψ2
ψ2
)])
=
∫ T
0
h(θ · ϕ(t))dt+ rθ · α2[ψψ](T )− I(T, ψψ)
≤
∫ T
0
h · ϕ(t)dt+ r · α2[ψψ](T )− J(T, ψ)
= c(x, T, ψ
ψ
, α[ψ
ψ
]).
Together with (100) we get that
c(x, T, (ψ), α[ψ]) ≤ c(x, T, ψ
ψ
, α[ψ
ψ
])
and therefore,
sup
ψ∈P2,T∈R+
c(x, T, (ψ), α[ψ]) ≤ sup
ψ∈P2I ,T∈R+
c(x, T, ψ, α[ψ]).
This shows (98).
We next show (99). Let α ∈ Ax. Toward constructing α ∈ Ax let γ : [0,D] →
∏I
i=1[0,Di]
be Borel measurable, satisfying
γ(w) ∈ argmin
ξ
{h · ξ : ξ
I∏
i=1
[0,Di], θ · ξ = w}, w ∈ [0,D].
The existence follows from a measurable selection argument (such as Corollary 10.3 in the
appendix of [8]). Set
ϕ(t) = θ·x+θ·yt+θ·ψ1(t)−θ·ψ2(t)+α1[(ψ1, ψ2)](t)−α2[(ψ1, ψ2)](t), t ≥ 0, (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ P2I
and
ϕ(t) = γ(ϕ(t)), t ≥ 0.
Define
α2[(ψ
1, ψ2)](t) := α2[(θ · ψ1, θ · ψ2)](t)µi∗ei∗ , t ≥ 0, (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ P2I ,
and
α1[(ψ
1, ψ2)](t) := ϕ(t)− x− yt− ψ1(t) + ψ2(t) + α2[(ψ1, ψ2)](t), t ≥ 0, (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ P2I .
The strategy α is admissible. Indeed, causality follows since α satisfies this property. Mono-
tonicity of each coordinate of α2[(ψ
1, ψ2)](·) follows by the monotonicity of α2[(θ ·ψ1, θ ·ψ2)](·),
and monotonicity of θ ·α1[(ψ1, ψ2)](·) follows since the latter equals to α1[(θ ·ψ1, θ ·ψ2)](·) which
is monotone by admissibility of α1. Finally, for every w ∈ [0,D] one has γ(w) ∈
∏I
i=1[0,Di]
and therefore ϕ takes values in
∏I
i=1[0,Di].
Next, note that
h · ϕ(t) = h(ϕ(t)), t ≥ 0,
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r ·α2[(ψ1, ψ2)](t) = ri∗µi∗α2[(θ ·ψ1, θ ·ψ2)](t) = rα2[(θ ·ψ1, θ ·ψ2)](t), t ≥ 0, (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ P2I
and
J(T, (ψ1, ψ2)) ≥ I(T, (θ · ψ1, θ · ψ2)), T ≥ 0, (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ P2I .
The last inequality follows by the definition of I, see (96). Therefore for every ψ = (ψ1, ψ2) ∈
P2I one has
c(x, T, ψ, α[ψ])
=
∫ T
0
h · ϕ(t)dt+ r · α2[(ψ1, ψ2)](T ) − J(T, (ψ1, ψ2))
≤
∫ T
0
h(ϕ(t))dt + rα2[(θ · ψ1, θ · ψ2)](T )− I(T, (θ · ψ1, θ · ψ2))
= c(x, T, (θ · ψ1, θ · ψ2), α[(θ · ψ1, θ · ψ2)])
Hence,
sup
ψ∈P2I ,T∈R+
c(x, T, ψ, α[ψ]) ≤ sup
ψ∈P2,T∈R+
c(x, T, ψ, α[ψ])
and (99) follows.
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